discussed the notion that people often deceive themselves. In essence, they suggest that in some situations people avoid confronting undesirable aspects of themselves. In order to avoid the information, it must be true that a person is already aware in some sense of what is being avoided.
Gur and Sackeim claim to have overcome this paradox that has preoccupied many philosophers (e.g., Demos, 1960; Fingarette, 1969; Sartre, 1956 ) and go on to suggest not only that self-deception is an occasional happening but that it can even interfere with selfrecognition. In particular, they claim that people deny recognizing their own voices under conditions in which physical indexes clearly show that recognition has in fact taken place.
In Gur and Sackeim's experiment, subjects were asked to say which of a series of recorded voices was their own. Galvanic skin response (GSR) recordings were made simultaneously. The major finding was that when a subject's own voice was presented, the GSR was higher than when other voices were presented, even when recognition was not reported. Gur indicates that recognition must have taken place at some level of cognitive processing.
There is, however, another possible explanation for the finding. Although GSR is used in lie detection, it does not respond only to lies but is an index of any kind of arousal. It is suggested, then, that the GSR responses observed by Gur and Sackeim can occur whenever people are faced with the task of identifying any known voice. It would then follow that if the problem for each subject was; to identify some other specific target voice, results similar to those found by Gur and Sackeim would be obtained.
Method Subjects
The subjects were 30 female university undergraduates students, all of whom had always lived in Australia.
Apparatus
Every attempt was made to match the materials used by Gur and Sackeim, within the limits of available equipment. Master tapes were made on Scotch low-noise recording tape (6.35 mm X 548.6 m). Tapes were recorded and played back on a Revox A77 reel-to-reel tape recorder. At the onset of a voice from the tape recorder, a voice-activated relay was used to trigger an electronic timer. The timer was stopped when the subject pushed one of two buttons on a small panel in front of her. The choice of buttons indicated each subject's response as being either her own or a different voice.
GSR was measured by a Beckman skin resistance cou-589 pier (Model 9892A) with a Beckman preamplifier (Model 46ID) and power amplifier (Model 411). GSR (change in conductance) measurements were read from a Fluke 8010A Digital Multimeter. Silver / silver chloride electrodes (6 mm in diameter) were used in conjunction with Electrogel as the electrolyte.
Materials
Two pro forma procedures recorded (a) the degree of certainty with which each subject responded to each voice (i.e., certain/uncertain), and (b) the number and type of errors, if any, each subject thought she had made (after Gur & Sackeim, 1979, p. 153) for both tasks.
Procedure
Subjects were requested to come to the laboratory on two separate occasions. At the first session, their voices were recorded as they read material from Kuhn (1962) . Two master tapes were made. The first tape contained "own" and "other" voices and was compiled in exactly the same way as that described by Gur and Sackeim (1979, p. 1S3) . The second tape used the same format as the first (i.e., five blocks of six voices differing in durations of 2, 4, 6, 12, and 24 sec), the only difference being that a "target" voice was used in the same relative position as the "own" voice in the first tape. A target voice was always that of a person the subject reported being associated with for a least 12 months. The familiar "other" voices were chosen from the remaining members of the subjects' tutorial groups that had met for over a semester. However, personal friends were excluded to avoid any possibility of the judgment of "Self" having been extended to include highly significant others.
On arrival for the second session, electrodes were attached to the subject's hands in exactly the same way as described by Gur and Sackeim (p. 152) , after which the subject was seated behind a small table. Instructions given to the subject closely followed those outlined by Gur and Sackeim (p. 152) . The subject was asked to listen to the tape and report whether or not each voice, was the target voice.
After a few minutes, the tape containing the subject's own voice was run. The subject's verbal responses, GSR changes in conductivity, and reaction times were noted by the experimenter. At the end of the first tape, each subject completed a second questionnaire about the number and type of errors she thought she had made. Following this, a second set of instructions was given:
The second tape which I am about to play for you is exactly the same in format as the first tape. The one difference however, Is that instead of attempting to identify your own voice you should attempt to identify a target voice. Once again, please indicate your degree of certainty.
The subject was then given the name of the person whose voice she should attempt to identify.
Results
Consistent with Gur and Sackeim's results, we found that the psychophysiological reactivity to one's own voice was significantly greater than that found to the voice of others.
A two-factor (Self vs. Other Voice Condition X Trials) repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) on GSR scores showed a significant effect of self versus other conditions, F(\, 29) = 31.18, p < .001 (see Figure  1) . The interaction effect was not significant, F(4, 116)= 1.53, p < .25. This clearly indicates that the present procedure was adequate to produce the main effect found by Gur and Sackeim. As predicted, the target versus other condition revealed the same trend that was shown to exist in the self versus other condition (see Figure 2) . A two factor (Target vs. Other Condition X Trials) repeated-measures ANOVA en GSR scores showed a main effect of target versus other condition, F(l, 29) = 19.67, p<.00t. There was no significant main effect of trials, F(4, 116) = .67, p< .25, and again there was no significant interaction effect, F(4, 116) = .62, p < .25. Gur and Sackeim's account of self-deception does not appear able to predict the significant main effect.
A comparison was made between the GSR scores of self and target conditions. Consistent with the hypothesis, no significant difference existed between the main effects of these two sets of responses. As revealed by a two-factor (Self vs. Target Condition X Trials) repeated-measures ANOVA, F(l, 29) = .25, p < .25. The main effect of trials was significant, F(4, 116) = 3.99, p < .01. There was no significant interaction effect, F(4, 116) =2.30, p<.\.
These results tend to support the contention that self-deception is not the major factor responsible for Gur and Sackeim's findings. We can conclude that GSR responses to one's own voice decline with continued repetition of the stimulus, but there is no significant difference of size of GSR response to one's own or to some other target voice.
Gur and Sackeim contended that self-deception could be identified by showing that GSR reactivity to one's own voice is as high when the subject recognizes that fact as when the subject denies the fact. They also contended that GSR reactivity to the voices of others is as low when the subject responds correctly as when misidentifications are made. These predictions were also borne out in this study.
Gur and Sackeim's mode of analysis was used. Subjects were divided into four groups.
The first group consisted of subjects who made no errors (n = % for own-voice condition, « = 18 for target-voice condition). The second group consisted of subjects who made false-negative errors only (n = 16 for ownvoice condition and n = 9 for target-voice condition). The third group consisted of subjects who made false-positive errors only (n = 1 for own-voice condition and « = 2 for target-voice condition). Finally, the fourth group consisted of subjects who made both falsepositive and false-negative errors (n = 5 for own-voice condition and n = 1 for targetvoice condition).
According to Our and Sackeim's hypothesis, if subjects hold contradictory beliefs when misidentifications are made, one would expect that among those subjects who committed false-negative errors only, GSR levels for true-positive and false-negative responses would not differ, whereas a significant difference should exist between both true-positive and true-negative errors and between falsenegative and true-positive errors. This hypothesis was based on the idea that one's own voice leads to autonomic arousal-that is, in the case of a true-positive response and in the case of a false-negative response-because it was argued that correct identification did, in fact, occur at some other level of cognitive processing.
The results were on the whole consistent with Gur and Sackeim's. In the group who made no errors, GSR reactivity for true-positive responses was greater than for true-negative responses, /(7) = 3.10, p<.Ql, one- tailed (own-voice recognition only). The most important comparisons for Gur and Sackeim's hypothesis are to be made in the group that made false-negative errors only. Once again, the trend was similar to that found in the original study. A comparison of GSR for both true-positive and false-negative responses with GSR for true-negative responses revealed significant differences, 1(15) = 2.33, p < .05, and t(l5) = 2,07, p < .05, respectively. There was no significant difference between true-positive and false-negative responses, f(15)<.l. This finding was, once again, as Gur and Sackeim predicted and found (see Figure 3) . Because there was only one error made in the false-positive group, a test of significance was inappropriate. According to Gur and Sackeim's hypothesis, no conclusions can be drawn about the group who committed both types of errors because differing motivational factors are implied.
However, Gur and Sackeim's explanation does not appear to be the appropriate one because a similar trend appeared in the data in which subjects were confronted by a target voice. In the group that committed no errors, we found that GSR reactivity was greater for true-positive responses than for true-negative responses, /(17) = 1.83,p < .05. In the group that made false-negative errors only, a comparison of true-positive and false-negative responses was made with true-negative responses and showed there was a significant difference in both cases, f(8) = 2.76, p < .025, and f(8) = 2.53, p < .025, respectively. Levels of GSR reactivity for false-negative and truepositive responses did not differ, i(8) = .98, p < . 1. Because only two subjects made falsenegative errors, a test of significance was not conducted. The results, however, reflected the same trend as in the self/other condition (see Figure 4) .
It has been shown that Gur and Sackeim's results are replicable and reliable findings. However, the fact that the same pattern of responses was elicited from the same subjects in a target-voice condition suggests that Gur and Sackeim's explanation of their results, namely self-deception, is not correct. Gur and Sackeim claim that the fact that those who "deny" the presence of their own voices show as much GSR reactivity as those who correctly identify their own voices. This claim is a strong argument for the presence of self-deception, but there can be no such motivation to deny the existence of the voice of a mere acquaintance.
Conclusion
We were able to replicate Gur and Sackeim's findings of high GSR when a person's own voice was present, irrespective of whether recognition was reported. But the same results were also obtained when the voice to be recognized was not the subject's own. Clearly, the effect has not been proven to be due to self-deception. It is worth noting, however, that GSR levels were regularly higher for the two types of target voices than for "other" voices whether or not these voices were correctly identified. This finding clearly indicates that at some level there is a degree of perception.
It should be made clear that we do not intend to imply that the general phenomenon of self-deception does not exist. The theorists of self-deception do not expect that people avoid confrontation with every aspect of themselves; rather, they seem to imply that only those aspects of themselves that people find unpleasant become the focus of the selfdeception process. Unless there are good reasons to expect that people are greatly dissatisfied with the sound of their own voices, Gur and Sackeim's experiment cannot be expected to show major effects due to self-deception.
